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I loved this book. It’s not an easy read, but it’s deeply rewarding – an important mono-
graph and a useful reference, all in one. Its 2008 Lakatos Prize was well-earned. Gauging
What’s Real is also a book that metaphysicians should take notice of, because it overlaps
with – and often challenges – much of the literature on natural properties and Humean
supervenience.
But noticing Healey’s book is one thing, and comprehending its depth is quite another.
The learning curve is very steep – steeper than necessary, perhaps. It would be outrageous
to recommend that a non-specialist pick up Gauging What’s Real without a “prep course”
in the philosophy of gauge theory. So let me first provide, insofar as space allows, a prep
course and a list of introductory readings.
The place to begin is Lange (2002), which discusses the metaphysics of classical field
theories. By the end of Chapter 2, you will have learned that electromagnetism employs a
vector quantity called the potential (one component is measured in the familiar unit of volts).
The curious thing about the potential is that its value is of no predictive significance. Only
certain derivatives of this quantity matter in the calculation of experimental predictions. As
Lange notes, the “classic” response to this fact has been to deny that the potential is phys-
ically real, appealing instead to the electric and magnetic fields as the theory’s fundamental
ontology.
If you don’t finish Lange’s book (I recommend that you do), make sure to skip ahead
to page 285 of the final chapter, where he briefly explains the Aharonov-Bohm effect. This
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experimentally-measured phenomenon casts considerable doubt on the “classic” ontology of
electric and magnetic fields. It turns out that electromagnetism can influence a measurable
feature of quantum particles (their complex phase) even in regions with zero electromagnetic
field. This motivates Healey’s main project: the search for a new ontology, beyond just the
field, for electromagnetism.
With Lange under your belt, you’ll be prepared for the first six pages of Healey, before
he starts talking about fiber bundles.
This is a bit of a problem with the book, pedagogically – Healey breaks out the mathemat-
ical big guns before he needs to. Much of what needs explaining, including Aharonov-Bohm,
would benefit from an informal first-pass look which he doesn’t provide. Fortunately, there
does exist an accessible introduction to the math Healey employs: Chapter 3 of Maudlin
(2007). Healey would surely ask that you take Maudlin’s philosophical claims with a grain
of salt, but I imagine he’d agree that this chapter provides an excellent introduction to fiber
bundles, pitched specifically at the “core” philosopher.
That’s the last of the assigned reading. Now on to Healey.
His first four chapters form a self-contained study of classical (that is, non-quantum)
gauge theories. Since the Aharonov-Bohm experiment depends crucially on the interaction of
electromagnetism with a quantum particle, this may seem like an artificial distinction. But I
urge the reader not to be tempted by such thoughts. The metaphysical upshot of Aharonov-
Bohm rests on the fact that the local values of the electric and magnetic fields do not
determine the results of the experiment. Similar results could be achieved in purely classical
physics, if there were a classical complex field that interacted with electromagnetism, and
whose complex phase differences were measurable. In our world, as it turns out, the only such
“field” is the wavefunction of a quantum particle – but that seems to be a metaphysically
contingent feature of our world. So the metaphysical implications of Aharonov-Bohm extend
to at least some classical worlds, and do not essentially depend on quantum theory.
What are those metaphysical implications? Healey argues that the worlds described by
classical gauge theories are not made up of fundamental fields localized at points, but instead
exhibit a sort of holism. There are three lines of response available to the Aharonov-Bohm
example. One is to retain the classic ontology of fields, but allow them to act instantaneously
at a distance. This may sound unpalatable at face. Moreover, as Healey notes it doesn’t
make much sense (for technical reasons) to respond in this way to the Aharonov-Bohm
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effect in gauge theories more complicated than electromagnetism, such as the theory of
chromodynamics that describes the strong nuclear force.
One response that does work – technically, at least – is to accept the unobservable
potential as a real and fundamental physical quantity. This view breaks down into a number
of versions, but Healey argues that they all fall prey to the same problem: they entail that
electromagnetism is indeterministic. The problem arises as follows. Suppose I hand you
a specification of the electromagnetic potential everywhere at some time t. To figure out
the potential that should result at some t′ (either before or later), you’d naturally seek
a solution of the theory that obeys Maxwell’s equations, which codify the known laws of
electromagnetism. Then you’d check what value the potential takes on at t′. The problem
is that there are infinitely many distinct solutions to the equations, each with a different
potential at t′. These solutions are all empirically equivalent, so usually we ignore the
differences between them. But if the potential is a fundamental quantity, we’d better stop
ignoring such differences – and we are left with a bizarre sort of unobservable indeterminism.
This argument has been around for some time, but Healey backs it up with a new,
entirely original argument. He shows that if one accepts some plausible assumptions of
David Lewis’s account of how theoretical terms refer, it is impossible for us to construct
terms that refer to values of the unobservable potential. Thus, even if the interpretations
Healey opposes are correct, the fundamental physical facts according to these interpretations
cannot be expressed in any of our theories.
Healey thinks we can do better, by taking the third of the three options I mentioned. He
offers an ontology for electromagnetism and other gauge theories that he calls the “holonomy
interpretation.” The distinguishing feature of this interpretation is its holism: rather than
being localized at points, the fundamental physical quantities inhere in closed loop-shaped
regions of spacetime. These properties do not generally supervene on the features of the
points making up the loops.
All this has so far been restricted to classical gauge theories. Healey goes on in the second
half of his book to discuss the technical difficulties and ontological prospects of quantum
gauge theories. I’m afraid these four chapters will resist comprehension by non-specialists,
but for the specialist community they will prove invaluable. (The rest of my review will
probably elude the non-specialist, too, for which I apologize.)
That said, the question of how to quantize gauge theories is so deeply vexed that, in-
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evitably, a few important approaches are ignored. Where possible, Healey is careful to
work within the framework of algebraic quantum field theory, a decision I applaud given the
unique mathematical precision of this approach compared with other forms of quantum field
theory. But he is not always clear about the tension that exists between this approach and
some of the quantization schemes he discusses. For instance, he begins by discussing quan-
tization that involves gauge-fixing (that is, imposing a deterministic equation of motion on
the potential). This otherwise-excellent discussion neglects the fact that research by Franco
Strocchi has shown that these forms of quantization, at least in the standard textbook form
which Healey presents, are incompatible with the algebraic approach. Gauge-fixing methods
are widely employed, and I don’t think they should either be omitted or quickly dismissed
from a discussion like this. But Healey’s book would have benefited from some discussion of
the alternatives to the algebraic approach (e.g., effective field theories), which are currently
needed to make sense of methods like gauge-fixing.
Readers interested in alternatives to the quantization schemes discussed by Healey should
look in two places. The major approach he leaves out (perhaps because it involves a discrete
picture of spacetime) is lattice gauge theory. Thorough discussions can be found in any
number of textbooks. The other, far less well known scheme is one due to Thirring and
Narnhofer (1992). These authors suggest a way around the no-go theorems of Strocchi
by proposing an algebraic gauge quantum field theory that employs non-separable Hilbert
spaces. This approach has the interesting consequence that the potential is not even defined
as a physical quantity on the resulting quantum field theory, laying to rest (if correct) the
dispute about whether the potential is physically real. But it is far from clear that Thirring
and Narnhofer’s approach will bear fruit, any more than the many alternatives discussed by
Healey. I’m mainly thankful that our author treats quantum gauge theory the way it ought
to be treated – as an open question. He can be forgiven for overlooking a couple of the many
possible answers.
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